Adapting agricultural water governance to climate change : Experience from Germany, Spain and California

This study describes and discusses initiatives taken by public (water) agencies in the state of Brandenburg in Germany, the state of California in the USA and the Ebro River Basin in Spain in response to the challenges which climate change poses for the agricultural water sector. The drivers and actors and the process of changing agricultural water governance are its particular focus. The assumptions discussed are: (i) the degree of planned and anticipatory top-down implementation processes decreases if actions are more decentralized and are introduced at the regional and local level; (ii) the degree of autonomous and responsive adaptation approaches seems to grow with actions at a lower administrative level. Looking at processes of institutional change, a variety of drivers and actors are at work such as changing perceptions of predicted climate impacts; international obligations which force politicians to take action; socio-economic concerns such as the cost of not taking action; the economic interests of the private sector. Drivers are manifold and often interact and, in many cases, reforms in the sector are driven by and associated with larger reform agendas. The results of the study may serve as a starting point in assisting water agencies in developing countries with the elaboration of coping strategies for tackling climate change-induced risks related to agricultural water management

Perspectives on institutional change - water management in Europe

CONTENTS: Mapping institutional change... 3, Insa Theesfeld, Frauke Pirscher; Affordability as an institutional obstacle to water-related price reforms... 9, Erik Gawel, Wolfgang Bretschneider; Analysing the shortcomings of the Ukrainian urban waste water sector - Institutional options for modernisation ... 35, Herwig Unnerstall, Nina Hagemann; Gemeinschaftsgüter und Gemeinwohl - Theoretischer Erkenntnisgehalt und praktische Relevanz für die Regionalentwicklung am Beispiel von Wasserinfrastrukturen und Kulturlandschaften ... 55, Andreas Röhring, Timothy Moss, Ludger Gailing, Rita Gudermann; Explaining top-down institutional design: The introduction of River Basin Management in Portugal... 85, Andreas Thiel, Catrin Egerton; Decentralization failures in post-socialist fishery management ... 107, Insa Theesfeld, Oscar Schmidt --

Constraints for collective action in Bulgaria's irrigation sector

"Water for irrigation and irrigation infrastructure are both common pool resources, due to their low excludability and high rivalry. The well-known common pool resource dilemma is often the consequence. Collective action may be a way how societies can overcome this dilemma. First results from a three-month empirical field study in Bulgaria are presented trying to explain how actor groups characteristics, such as lack of trust between community members and effective institutional settings at the local level, such as information asymmetry, limited sanctioning and enforcement mechanisms and almost no monitoring mechanisms provide conditions under which opportunistic behaviour dominates. The effective rules-in-use in local communities are presented. The simplest example is watering crops without paying the water price. Individuals will use their power to maintain their opportunistic strategies and, consequently, they will not agree to any rule change. Moreover, the actors' attitude towards collective action is very pessimistic. This has a crucial impact on the evolving of credible commitment which is one prerequisite for collective action. The effects on water management can be severe and the common pool resource dilemma situation may continue. This article questions if there are additional influencing variables inherited from the transformation process that will have an impact on the institutional change and constrain the emergence of collective action solutions. The discussion is based on empirical material from Varbiza village in the south of Bulgaria." (author's abstract)Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Einschränkungen, die sich für kollektive Handlungen im bulgarischen Bewässerungssektor ergeben. Das empirische Material stammt aus Varbiza, einem Dorf im Süden Bulgariens. Wasser zur Bewässerung und Bewässerungsinfrastruktur sind beides gemeinsame allgemeine Betriebsmittel, was oftmals mit Problemen verbunden ist. Kollektivtätigkeit kann eine Möglichkeit sein, wie Gesellschaften dieses Dilemma überwinden können. In diesem Beitrag werden erste Ergebnisse einer dreimonatigen empirischen Feldstudie in Bulgarien vorgestellt und es wird erläutert, wie die Merkmale der beteiligten Gruppen und wirkungsvolle institutionelle Vorgaben auf lokaler Ebene Sanktionierungs- und Durchsetzungsmechanismen beschränken. Es werden die wirkungsvollsten Richtlinien, die von den lokalen Gemeinschaften verwendet werden, anhand einiger Beispiel dargestellt. Das einfachste Beispiel ist die Bewässerung von Getreide, ohne den Wasserpreis zu zahlen. Einzelpersonen verwenden ihre Energie, um ihre opportunistischen Strategien beizubehalten, und infolgedessen stimmen sie keiner Änderung der Spielregeln zu. Außerdem ist die Einstellung der Beteiligten gegenüber Kollektivtätigkeit sehr pessimistisch. Dies hat entscheidende Auswirkungen auf die Entwicklung von Glaubwürdigkeit, die eine Vorbedingung für Kollektivtätigkeit ist. Der Artikel geht der Frage nach, ob es zusätzliche beeinflussende Variablen gibt, die vom Transformationsprozess herrühren und Auswirkungen auf den institutionellen Wandel haben und somit die Möglichkeiten kollektiver Problemlösung einschränken. (ICDÜbers

Irrigation and Water Regulation Systems in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria in Comparison with Latvia, East Germany and Romania

Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

A breach of tradition during socialism: the case of water syndicates in Bulgaria

Im Verlauf der post-sozialistischen Übergangsphase verschlechterten sich die Bewässerungseinrichtungen Bulgariens erheblich und konnten nicht mehr die Ansprüche der neuen Landbesitzer und der landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsstruktur befriedigen. Deshalb erlässt die bulgarische Regierung zwei neue Gesetze mit dem Ziel, gemeinsame Handlungen zu fördern, Wassernutzervereinigungen zu etablieren und ein nachhaltiges Wassermanagement zu erreichen. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht der Autor das häufig vorgebrachte Argument, dass Wassernutzervereinigungen in Bulgarien auf einfache Weise eingeführt werden können, weil sie mit den Wassersyndikaten verwurzelt sind. Empirische Ergebnisse von Untersuchungen einzelner Dörfer zeigen, dass die kollektive Erinnerung an Nutzungsregeln und Verhaltensmustern früherer Wassersyndikate begrenzt ist. Der Autor erklärt den Bruch mit dieser Tradition mit der Migration von den Dörfern in die Städte, der Unterdrückung des prä-kommunistischen so genannten kapitalistischen Verhaltens und der Dauer der kommunistischen Herrschaftsperiode. Zudem zeigt die Analyse der historischen kooperativen Entwicklung in Bulgarien, dass die Wassersyndikate administrativ von oben durchgesetzt wurden und nichts mit klassischen kooperativen Prinzipien gemein hatten. (ICGÜbers)"During the post-socialist transition period, the Bulgarian irrigation facilities deteriorated to a large extent and no longer meet the needs of the new landowner and agricultural production structure. The Bulgarian government therefore enacted two new laws to encourage collective action and to establish water user associations in order to achieve sustainable water management. In this article, we will question the frequent argument that water user associations could easily be established in Bulgaria, because they are rooted in the water syndicates. Empirical findings from village case studies reveal that limited collective memory exists today about former water syndicates' rules-in-use and patterns of action. We will explain this breach of tradition by the migration from villages to cities, the suppression of precommunist so-called capitalist behaviour, and the length of the communist period. Moreover, the analysis of the historical cooperative development in Bulgaria shows that the water syndicates were enforced by a top-down approach and did not have much in common with the classic cooperative principles." (author's abstract

The Political Economy of Decentralization in Thailand - Does Decentralization Allow for Peasant Participation?

One of the most important issues in rural development is empowerment and entitlement of farmers through participation. Decentralisation and participation are seemingly interdependent. Therefore, the paper begins with a theoretical discussion on the cause and effects of this interdependence. Decentralisation is often advertised as means to better incorporate the views and wishes of local actors. Yet, a decentralization process is no guaranty for political participation of local actors. The state induced decentralisation process in rural Thailand serves as an example to investigate forces that hamper or facilitate political participation. Change and uncertainty are inherent of political systems and the agricultural sector. Hence, this paper focuses in particular, on the last two politically turbulent decades in Thailand and its impact on political participation in rural Thailand. The Tambon Administration Organization (TAO) as one means of and likewise outcome of the decentralization process will serve as an example to discuss the effects of decentralisation on participation in the TAOs, using the concept of accountability. After increasing decentralization at the end of the 90s the last decade was coined by centralization policies. The ongoing political unrest could potentially trigger a new wave of political decentralization. However, the real reason for decentralization is not to distribute power but to maintain central effectiveness. Thus, we expect to see more decentralization without participation.Agricultural and Food Policy,

Ex-ante Policy Assessment of Agricultural, Environmental, and Rural Policies from an Institutional Perspective: The Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment

Ex-ante impact assessment of agricultural, environmental, and rural policies has become an integral part of political decision making processes in the EU. While there is a large variety of agrienvironmental modelling tools available to analyse likely social, economic, and environmental impacts of these policies, scientifically well-founded ex-ante policy assessment tools capturing the institutional dimension are still missing. In this paper, we introduce a formalised procedure for modelling – ex-ante – institutional aspects for policy implementation: the ‘Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment’ (PICA). PICA has been designed as an explorative, yet formalised methodology that enables policy makers to identify at an early stage potential institutional incompatibilities. After providing a brief overview of relevant approaches for policy assessment we elaborate on the four distinct steps of PICA and use a core element of the EU Nitrate Directive to illustrate its function.Methodology, Ex-ante Policy Assessment, Institutional Policy Assessment, Agricultural and Food Policy, Environmental Economics and Policy,

Gemeinwohlorientierte Flächenpolitik unter Zugzwang - Überblick und Einblicke in bottom-up Initiativen

Knapp über die Hälfte der Fläche Deutschlands wird landwirtschaftlich genutzt. Zunehmende Konkurrenz um die Fläche, die auch durch den zunehmenden Flächenbedarf anderer Sektoren angetrieben wird, spürt man im landwirtschaftlichen Sektor deutlich. Steigende Bodenpreise treiben den landwirtschaftlichen Strukturwandel an. Eine bottom-up Antwort darauf sind gemeinwohlorientierte Organisationen gemeinschaftlicher Governance für landwirtschaftliche Flächen, die dem Markt zunächst Fläche entziehen und diese langfristig zu ertragsangemessenem Marktzins meist ökologisch wirtschaftenden kleineren Betrieben wieder zur Verfügung stellen. Basierend auf einer deutschlandweiten erstmaligen empirischen Untersuchung verzeichnen diese bottom-up Initiativen zwar noch eine geringe absolute Flächenausbreitung, jedoch ein deutliches Wachstum bei der Anzahl ihrer Mitglieder, Kleininvestoren und Spender. Eine breite Ausdifferenzierung an Organisationsformen ist entstanden, diese gelten als Nukleus der sozialen Entwicklung. Betriebsleiter*innen von landwirtschaftlichen Partnerbetrieben solcher gemeinschaftlichen und gemeinwohlorientierten Organisationen, genau wie Beteiligte und Kapitalgeber*innen aus der breiten Gesellschaft, haben eine Nachfrage und einen Bedarf an gemeinsamer Verantwortung und Mitbestimmung über das Management und den Umgang mit landwirtschaftlichen Flächen sowie der Ressource Boden. Die empirische Datenerhebung im Projekt "Neue Organisationsformen des gemeinschaftlichen Landeigentums" (Curtiss et al. 2022) zeigte einige positive ökonomische Vorteile für Partnerbetriebe, ohne im großen Stil den Bodenmarkt zu verzerren, und relativ stabile Rahmenbedingungen, um ökologische Zielsetzungen langfristig abzusichern. Darüber hinaus konnten als gemeinwohlstiftende Auswirkungen soziale Einflüsse auf und für die ländliche Bevölkerung verdeutlicht werden. Die landwirtschaftliche Bodengesetzgebung muss sich auf Länderebene zu diesen Organisationen positionieren. Eine gemeinwohlorientierte Flächenpolitik bezüglich des Eigentumsverkehrs landwirtschaftlicher Flächen wäre ein Novum

Categorizing urban commons: Community gardens in the Rhine-Ruhr agglomeration, Germany

Urban gardening has become a growing international movement. Many urban gardens are established, organized, and managed collectively as commons. Particularly in developed countries, these community gardens (a subset of urban gardens) emerge not only in response to a lack of locally produced food, but also in response to a lack of democratic use of public spaces or missing opportunities and time for socializing. They then give rise to social networks that fulfil various social functions. Although community gardens are often listed as examples of commons, they have thus far lacked closer scientific examination. Hence, we present criteria to explore and categorize community gardens as commons by their degree of collectivity. This is based on five components: resource system, infrastructure, resource units, work, social time. We classify these criteria further according to various styles of use, ranging from individual use to sharing. To demonstrate the utility of this model we implement a quantitative study of community gardens located in one of the most urbanized area in Germany, the Rhine-Ruhr Agglomeration. Our results show a high diversity of collective use and the importance of sharing immaterial components in sustaining community gardens, notably social values. We can empirically demonstrate that gardeners develop diverse ways of collective action and social interaction to manage and change their urban environment. To aid in thinking about these issues, we provide an initial typology of community gardens according to their relative degrees of collectivity, reflecting the underlying values of these alternative agricultural system

Application of the Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment (PICA) to the implementation of the EU Nitrate Directive in Midi-Pyrenees. Evaluation and suggestions for further improvement and integration into the final version of SEAMLESS-IF

Agricultural and Food Policy, Environmental Economics and Policy, Farm Management, Land Economics/Use,